LLC Seminars

Here you find a calendar of the LLC seminars and other events that are of interest for the entire research center, such as the annual LLC Lecture and the LLC Poster Day.

For the more specialized seminars of the research groups at LLC, click here for the MUMBLE seminar, here for the Logic seminar and here for the Science & More Seminar.

The seminar convenor is Andrea Iacona (andrea.iacona@unito.it).

Next Seminars

Filippo Ferrari (University of Bologna): (Don't Fear) the Collapse

Thursday 14 May 2026, 16:00-18:00, Palazzetto Gorresio, Aula 7

Beall and Restall (2006) have offered an influential and controversial characterisation of logical pluralism (LP) as the thesis that our pre-theoretic notion of validity is indeterminate and admits multiple admissible precisifications, singling out different correct logics (e.g., classical, constructive, relevant). In this paper we critically assess the so-called “Collapse Problem” originally discussed in Priest (2006) and argue that it fails to establish its conclusion that LP collapses into monism. To this end, we first argue that the collapse problem comprises two distinct arguments: one from truth-preservation and one from normativity. We then consider each argument in turn and argue that both rely on a problematic understanding of some of the core tenets of LP. Accordingly, we conclude that neither of these arguments effectively undermines LP.

Past Seminars

Remco Heesen (London School of Economics): Unintended Consequences and Science Policy

Tuesday 5 May 2026, 17:30-19:00, Meeting Room 1, Philosophy Library, Palazzo Nuovo

Irene Binini (Università di Parma): Varieties of Impossibility. A Historical Overview of the Medieval and Early Modern Taxonomy of Impossibility

Thursday 12 February 2026, 15:00-17:00, Meeting Room 1, Philosophy Library, Palazzo Nuovo

Reading Group: Tim Williamson, "Overfitting and Heuristics in Philosophy"

Thursday 11 December and Wednesday 16 December 2025, 17:00-18:30, Meeting Room 1, Philosophy Library, Palazzo Nuovo

Simon Prosser (University of St. Andrews): Subjective Rates and Durations

Thursday 23 October 2025, 16:00-18:00, Meeting Room 1, Philosophy Library

Dan Lassiter (University of Edinburgh): Pragmatic intrusion in probability judgments around conditionals

Thursday 15 May 2025, 16-18, Aula 14, Palazzo Nuovo

Antonio Capuano (Auburn University): Reflections about Belief

Thursday 8 May 2025, 12-13h, Meeting Room 1, Philosophy Library, Palazzo Nuovo

Paolo Ghirardato (University of Turin): Event valence and subjective probability

Thursday 8 May 2025, 17-19h, Aula Antica, Palazzo Nuovo

Fabrice Correia (University of Geneva): The Logic of Grounding [book symposium]

Thursday 30 January 2025, 16-18, Palazzo Nuovo, Aula di Antica

Alexander Gebharter and Michal Sikorski (Marche Polytechnic University): Exploring the consequences of the limits of the principle of total evidence

Thursday 28 November 2024, 16-18h, Meeting Room 1, Philosophy Library, Palazzo Nuovo (basement)

The principle of total evidence says that all relevant information should be considered when making an inference about a hypothesis. In the first part of our talk, we argue that the criminalist’s paradox from the literature on the methodology of forensic science constitutes a counterexample against the principle of total evidence. The paradox arises, for example, if forensic scientists consider results from other forensic procedures for their own results. In such cases, their own results can become more reliable, but at the same time also dependent on those other forensic results and therefore less useful for decisions in court cases. We argue that structurally similar problems can also be found in other sciences. In forensic science, the problem is usually avoided by relying on the relevance principle which excludes the problematic information. In the second part we explore the relevance principle from a causal perspective. We walk through the most basic causal structures and show that following the relevance principle leads to the double-counting fallacy in most structures. We then propose an alternative causal version of the relevance principle that returns the correct results regardless of the causal setting. If time allows it, we finally propose a new normative model for scientific practice on the basis of these results.

David Liggins (University of Manchester): A Priorian solution to a Priorian paradox

Thursday 31 October 2024, 16-18h, Aula di Antica, Palazzo Nuovo, second floor

Non-nominal quantification is quantification into a syntactic position other than name position, such as predicate or sentence position. Metaphysicians are increasingly interested in putting such quantification to work: this is a major part of the contemporary movement known as “higher-order metaphysics”. However, non-nominal quantification generates various paradoxes, so it is timely to revisit these. This talk is about one of them: a paradox raised by A. N. Prior. In his 1961 paper ‘On a family of paradoxes’, Prior proved a theorem which seems to contradict easily observable facts involving belief, assertion, and many other phenomena. In this talk, I will set out the paradox, propose a new solution to it, and offer an explanation of why the flawed part of the paradoxical reasoning initially seemed compelling.

Vincenzo Crupi and Andrea Iacona (University of Turin): The Evidential Account of Conditionals. Foundations and Implications

Thursday 3 October 2024, 16-18, Aula di Antica, Palazzo Nuovo, second floor

In this talk we provide a discussion of our evidential account of conditionals. We set out an explicit defence of the account itself by offering four arguments based on a unified methodology.

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